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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000559

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SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: IS A WIN-WIN POSSIBLE AS CCM-CUF
INTERPARTY DIALOGUE ENTERS THE END GAME?

REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 0125

1B. DAR ES SALAAM 0084
1C. 06 DAR ES SALAAM 01835

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Purnell Delly for
reasons 1.4 (b, d).

SUMMARY

11. (C) At a joint April 6 press conference, the Zanzibar CCM
Secretary General, Yusuf Makamba, and the Civic United Front

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(CUF) Secretary General, Seif Malam Hamad, announced that the two parties had completed the initial stage of reconciliation talks. CUF party chairman, Dr. Ibrahim Lipumba, told the DCM that his party remains confident that President Kikwete will keep his word and broker a solution acceptable to both parties. CUF's bottom line request during the January to April 2007 discussions was a rerun of the elections followed by the formation of a government of national unity. Without a coalition Government of Zanzibar (GOZ) in place well in advance of 2010, CUF is convinced that the next round of Zanzibar general elections will be neither transparent nor fair. CUF leaders expect an agreement on the next step in the reconciliation to be decided by May at the latest. End summary.

CUF's Patience Based on Confidence in Kikwete

12. (C) For the last 15 months, CUF leaders have refrained from public criticism of the slow pace of the reconciliation process in Zanzibar because they "trust and respect" President Kikwete, Dr. Lipumba told the DCM on March 30. Lipumba stressed that since making a promise in his December 2005 inaugural speech to Parliament that he would work to resolve the divide on the Isles, Kikwete has been consistent in both words and actions. "His position has never changed." Hon. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, official leader of the opposition in the Union Parliament who headed up CUF's team during the reconciliation talks agreed. Mohamed told PolCouns on March 27 that CUF leaders knew through "back channel contacts" that Kikwete was working hard within CCM, tracking the issues,

discussing, persuading. Mohamed reiterated: "Until now, we have asked CUF members and our youth to be patient because we wanted to give President Kikwete enough time."

CUF Just Presented the Facts

¶3. (U) During the January to April dialogue, CUF's requests were straightforward: 1) acknowledge that the October 2005 elections in Zanzibar were not fair, thus not valid; 2) rerun the elections under an independent commission; 3) form a government of national unity that includes ministers appointed from the party that does not win. Hon. Mohamed described the three-month dialogue with CCM as "frank" and noted that all the issues CUF put on the table were backed up with objective documentation. Specifically, during the 2005 elections:

- Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) was not independent, but controlled by the GOZ;
- Zanzibar state-owned media ignored ZEC's rules and allocated disproportionate air time to ruling party candidates;
- opposition parties were not able to verify the Permanent Voters Register (PVR) and received the PVR only 12 hours before the polls opened;
- during the campaign period, CUF was not allowed to hold any rallies in the Donge district;
- the GOZ used local militia to intimidate voters during the voter registration, campaign and election periods;
- human rights abuses by GOZ militia groups occurred immediately following both the October and December 2005 elections in Zanzibar.

¶4. (C) CUF did not offer any proposal concerning how these problems should be resolved nor what form a government of national unity should take, according to Hon. Mohamed. "We

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outlined the facts: it is up to CCM to make a proposal." The interparty committee's joint report was forwarded to the secretary generals who are currently holding meetings to

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discuss the outcome and next steps. Mohamed emphasized: "We were adamant during the entire three-month dialogue that CUF does not want a Muafaka III, that is merely a written agreement with no political will behind it. We want change." (NOTE: Two previous Muafaka agreements, prior to the 2000 and 2005 Zanzibar elections, were negotiated between CCM and CUF over many months and promised fair elections and a coalition government. However, neither Muafaka was endorsed by the CCM Central Committee nor fully implemented.)

CUF's Bottom Line: Government of National Unity

¶5. (SBU) Whether or not CCM agrees to rerun the elections, Dr. Lipumba stated CUF is not ready to compromise on its demand that a government of national unity be in place well in advance of the preparation period for the 2010 elections. According to Lipumba: "A coalition government is the only solution to ensure that the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) would be genuinely independent. Otherwise, we have no confidence that the GOZ would not try in 2010, as it did in the previous elections, to influence the ZEC's decisions and actions."

¶6. (C) When the DCM questioned whether President Karume would accept a national unity government, Dr. Lipumba was confident that if the CCM Central Committee insists, Karume would have to comply. He cited a precedent: In 2000, Dr. Habib Bilal won two-thirds of the Zanzibar CCM primary popular vote. However, Amani Karume was chosen as the Zanzibar presidential candidate by the CCM Central Committee, despite Bilal's grassroots popularity.

CCM concerned about discrimination against Pemba

¶7. (C) Both CUF's Lipumba and Mohamed, and Rwekaza Mukandala, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam and a CCM member with close Central Committee contacts, emphasized that Kikwete and influential CCM members are concerned over Karume's blatant discrimination against Pembans. In the current Karume CCM cabinet, only Minister Hon. Zainib is from Pemba and was designated as a "minister without portfolio," and thus, has limited influence. Mukandala told PolCouns March 26 that Karume added Zainib to his cabinet only after "arm-twisting" by the CCM Central Committee. One GOZ Deputy Minister position and very few of 18 slots for Permanent Secretaries are held by Pembans, even though nearly 20

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percent of registered CCM members in Zanzibar are Pembans.

¶8. (C) Since the Karume administration began its second term, opportunities for education, GOZ jobs and investment in business in Zanzibar have virtually dried up for Pembans, regardless of political affiliation, Mukandala explained. In his view, CCM's concern that Karume's actions are unnecessarily deepening the divide between the two Isles may have been a factor in the December 2006 CCM Central Committee decision to allow the interparty dialogue to move ahead. Dr. Lipumba told the DCM that CUF leaders have consciously not raised the Pemban discrimination issue publicly, because they wanted the reconciliation process to go forward: "We know that President Kikwete and the CCM Central Committee are already concerned."

CCM Insiders Acknowledge CUF's Strength in Zanzibar

¶9. (C) CCM concerns about Zanzibar go beyond Karume's discriminatory policy toward Pembans, according to Mukandala. He told PolCouns March 27 that CCM party analysts realize that CUF continues to gain strength on both isles of Zanzibar. Mukandala said in December 2006, the CCM Central Committee decided to move forward with the CCM-CUF dialogue, knowing full well that CUF would demand a government of national unity. The nod was given based in part on CCM analysts' closed-door briefing to Central Committee members about the strength of CUF's support in Zanzibar.

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¶10. (C) Mukandala said that CCM insiders realized that despite the favoritism of the Zanzibar state media toward the ruling party in 2005, possible multiple voting by CCM members, the GOZ's use of militia to intimidate opposition supporters, and other irregularities noted by international observers, Karume still received only 53 percent of the vote. If the 2005 elections had been completely fair, CCM analysts recognize the result would have been much closer: a virtual dead heat. Mukandala maintains that CCM analysts acknowledge that CUF's support may continue to increase, especially among Zanzibar youth, and have advised CCM leaders that a CUF victory in 2010 is a realistic possibility.

¶11. (C) The creation of a national unity or coalition government is the right political move for CCM, in Mukandala's view, in order to position the party for a possible CUF presidency on Zanzibar in 2010. If CUF were to win, then CCM would still be inside the government. If CCM were to win, CUF would be included in the GOZ and both Unguja and Pemba would benefit: a win-win for both sides.

¶12. (C) When asked if a CCM Mainland government and CUF presidency in Zanzibar could work, CUF's Chairman Lipumba told the DCM that President Kikwete knows in order to maintain his respected status in the AU, SADC and other African fora as a supporter of democracy, the 2010 Zanzibar elections have to be transparent. Kikwete also knows that if Malam Seif Hamad were to be the CUF candidate and were to win in the next Zanzibar presidential election, they could work together. Lipumba said President Kikwete respects Hamad, and

knows he is a capable administrator as demonstrated during his stint as CCM's Chief Minister in the Government of Zanzibar (1984-1988).

And if no resolution...?

¶13. (C) In reply to the DCM's query on whether CUF's patience had a limit, Lipumba explained that CUF anticipated an agreement could be reached and announced some time in May.

Should these party-to-party negotiations deadlock or the impasse continue far past May with no agreement, Lipumba said CUF is prepared to go public with all the documentation the party has gathered showing serious irregularities in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections. To date, CUF has shared this information in full only with CCM during the interparty dialogue discussions.

Comment

¶14. (C) CUF Chair Lipumba asked the USG to continue to press President Kikwete for a rapid yet equitable resolution of the Zanzibar political impasse. He also suggested we ask President Karume to abide by whatever agreement is reached. On Monday, April 16, the Dar es Salaam press noted that President Kikwete had traveled to Zanzibar for a "private visit," and we suspect this trip may be related to the ongoing reconciliation process. We remain concerned, however, that President Karume may resist falling in line with whatever compromise might be reached, particularly if it meant the inclusion of CUF members in his current administration.

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